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RESPONSE TO "ISSUES ON APPEAL"

In addition to the issues of appeal set forth by the Appellant. Appellees

respectfully suggest that another issue on appeal is:
1.

Assuming that Ms. Moler-Lcw is was a "representative1' under Utah Rule of

E\ idence 504(a)(4). were some or all of the communications involving her not otherwise
"confidential" pursuant to Rule 504(a)(6)?

The Appellees preserved this issue below by successful!}' pursuing their Motion to
Compel testimony.

Lastly, in addition to the standard of review as set forth by the Appellant.

Appellees point out that the parlies seeking a pri\ ilege "has the burden of establishing
that communication was privileged." Hoffman \. (Jondor- 71- '}-~d 216. 21S
(Zimmerman dissenting) (Utah 19S5).
PET) RMINATIVK RULES

Appellees agree that the Determinative Rules set forth in the Appellants' Briefare
the rules that are determinative of this case.

KKSPONSK TO STA II MEN T OF THE CASK

The MoleiT "Statement of the Case" mischaraeteri/es the record below and

overstates the extent to which there was evidence about the age restricted nature of the

communitv. For example, there is no e\ idence that the age restriction was discussed "in
everv conversation...between Dennis Moler and Chris McCandlessC indeed the evidence
is to the contrarv. Mr. Moler testified that these conversations were occasional, and his

daughter testified that she never heard Mr. McCandless talk about the legal restrictions in
the comnumih. Indeed, Ms. Moler-Ecw is statetl that discussions about the age restricted

nature of the community were related only to the design aspects.
Furthermore, the Molers acknowledged thai they were aware, before they moved

to Redfealher Estates, of at least one exception to the age restriction, 'fhev acknowledged

that thev had granted consent to the purchase and occupancy b> a family named Kosick;

they con lend thev were unaware of the details of this exception, but Ihe disclosure ol this
sale, prior lo the Molers mov ing into the home, is undisputed. Furthermore, there is a lack
of evidence to suggest that the public notice of the removal of the age restnction was
withheld from the Molers. The Molers had constrictive notice by virtue of the

recordation of the Amended Declaration on August 2 1, 2002, before they closed on their

purchase, thai the age restriction had been removed as of that time.
Lasilv and most importantly, there is no e\ idence in the Court below that Ms.

Moler-Ecwis was "empowered.. .to identifv a law firm..." because of the Molers' alleged
lack of familiarity with civil litigation. Rather her involvement in the choice of a law

firm appears to have been more ol convenience: she contacted her friend to discuss her
parents' case. Notably, the retainer letter between the Molers and their lawyers was
executed by Mr. Moler, himself. Further, when Mr. and Mrs. Moler prepared for their
depositions, their daughter was not present.

RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS' SUMMARY Ol ARGUMENT

The Appellants seek to have this Court accept the contention, apparently made
after the fact, that Ms. Moler-Eew is was acting as a "representative" of her parents when

she was involved in various communications which the Appellants seek to protect. "I heir

argument seems to suggest that Ms. Moler-Eewis. while not licensed to practice law, was
acting in the role of an attorney assisting her parents. Clearly, however, her nonHcensLire as an attornev at the time in question, coupled with her father's disavowal ol her
status as his attornev, makes her former status as an attornev irrelevant. I he Court

should view Ms. Moler-Eew is's involvement jum as the Court would the presence of any

other offspring or relative, and must analyze whether or not she can be reasonably
considered to have been a representative of her parents. Despite the lack of specificity in
Utah R. Evid. 504. it cannot he fathomed that the drafters (d'the I 'tah Rules of E.vidcncc

would allow aiivone. regardless of then- status or stature, to be designated as a
"representative" after the fact.
Furthermore, even if Ms. Moler-Eew is acted as a rcpresentativ e in assisting her

parents in selecting counsel, her involvement thereafter was not. in any sense, necessary.
Rule 504(a)(0) provides that communications can be confidential only il they are "not
intended to be disclosed to third persons other than to those to whom disclosure is in

furtherance of the rendition of professional legal serv ices to the client or those reasonably
neeessarv for the transmission of the communication." There is no ev idence that Ms.

Moler-Eewis was necessarv m order to communicate between the counsel selected by her

parents and her father, who was a 35-year veteran of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
who had participated in "ten to fifteen" depositions (P. at 1241 ). Even if she acted as a
"representative of the client" in "obtain(ing| professional legal services," she did not "act
on advice rendered..." to that relationship., and her involvement after her lather's
retention of Strassberg <Sc Ensor was unnecessary.
RESPONSE TO APPKI I.AN IS' STATEMENT Ol

FACTS

For purposes of this Appeal. Appellees i\o not object to the factual statements in
tie Appellants' Brief except as set forth below.
A I.

While the Molers may not have been paities to a civil proceeding before the

lawsuit, Dennis Moler had been deposed "ten to fifteen" times prior to his deposition in
this case. (Dennis Moler Depo. at 10-11.)

M6.

Appellees dispute the existence o'Tmy "fraudulent or wrongful acts."

H10.

I he retainer letter between the Molers and their counsel was executed by

Dennis Moler. (Record at 1235-37.)

1)14.

Paragraph D14 of the Appellants1 facts is contrary to the evidence in the

record. A prerequisite lo the existence of an attorney-client relationship with Strassberg
& Elisor was a matter being opened and an invoice being generated. (Record at 1235.)
Ms. Moler-Eewis testified in her deposition that her alleged retainer agreement was onlv
"verbal." (Depo. of Wendy Moler-Ecw is at 11-12);' she hail never discussed the

Ms. Moler-Ecw is's deposition was taken on November 14, 2006. after the briefing and
i1k ruling on the Defendants" Joint Motion to Compel Testimony and Produce
liit'luiti; i. u: 'riik\] en uc\l n.iri'

ipensation for legal services, and she had never received a bill. (Id. at 5S.

eomne

ADDITIONAL FACTS

1.

Dennis Moler met to prepare for his deposition with his wife Marilynn and

his counsel, and without his daughter present (Moler Depo. p.2, IE 12-16).

2.

At the outset of his deposition. Mr. Moler was asked about the nature of his

retainer letter with his counsel, and about the documents he had reviewed at his

deposition; his counsel objected to both of those questions and instrticted the witness not
to answer. At that time, counsel for the Plaintiffs sought the Court's intervention which

was unavailable (Moler Depo. p.6, IE. 7). (Record at 1240.):
3.

Mr. Moler, who was a 35 \ear veteran of the E.B.I.. estimated that he had

been deposed 10 or 15 times prior to his deposition which was taken on October 10. 2006
(Moler Depo. p. 10, IE 11-17). (Record at 1241.)

4.

In his deposition, Mr. Moler was careful to point out that his daughter-

Documents. Consequently, her testimony was not considered by the Court when it heard
and decided the Motion. Nonetheless. Ms. Moler-Eew is's deposition testimonv was

presented to the Court by the Plaintiffs' counsel in their response to the Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment (Record at 154S-61). and it is thus properly part of the
record, even though it has not. as of the preparation of this Brief, been "filed". See
fonder v. A.L. Williams & Assoes., Inc.. 739 P.2d 634, 641 (Ul. Ct. App. 19S7)(()rme,

j., concurring); See also, ^t EaU^tyM^Arjx^^

761 P.2d 42,

45 (Ct. Ct. App. 19NS)

Copies of the cited pages to Ms. Molcr-Eewis's deposition are included in the Addendum
hereto, and Appellees will seek to supplement the Record with both deposition
transcripts.

: Where possible, for the convenience of the Court, reference is made to locations in the
record where parts of Mr. Moler's deposition can be found.

Wendv '7. .is not a practicing attorney now. She gratlualed from law school, but is not a

practicing attornev." (Moler Depo. p.14. IE 15-17.) (Record at 1242.)
5.

Mr. Moler testified when he signed the Real Estate Purchase Contract for

the residence, his daughter Wendy was present, but not acting as his counsel (Moler

Depo. p.32. IE 23-24); he stated she was there "to help out her lather. She was my

d.iughter and we just had her there because Chris Mc( 'andless was acting as the real
estate agent for Redfeathcr, and so I had her there just to help us in reviewing documents
and give us her opinion." (Moler Depo. p.33, 11. 1-5.) (Record at 1244.)
6.

Mr. Moler testified that he had had a conversation regarding Byron and

Linda Kosick with Mr. McCandless in "either the last week of September or the first

week of October in 2002," according to Mr. Molcr's recollection of that conversation Mr,
\lc( 'andless characteri/ed the Kosicks as mov ing in under a "special exemption." At tins
time, Mr. Moler states he was advised thai Mr. McCandless had "worked with Sandy

City and come up and had an exemption for them | the Kosicks | to be able to come in and
live in Redfeathcr..." Mr. Moler test died that the Kosicks bought into the community

"because it was a 55 and older community. That's why they hail bought in there just like
we had what was advertised, promised, and sole! was a 55 and older community. And

they had been adamant that's what they want in Redfeathcr and that's why they bought
there." (Moler Depo. p.52, IE 16-25)

7.

Mr. Moler was asked about discussions he'd had with his (.laughter since

the filing of the lawsuit (Moler Depo. p.^). IE 1X)( Record at 1245). lie was asked what

e had discussed w ith her in the lawsuit (Moler Depo. p.60) (Record at 1246) and his

lie

counsel objected. His counsel stated:

Mr. Ensor: Em going to object to that. It calls for attornev client

privilege. To the extent vou can answer that question without in
some wav relating what vou and I have discussed, then vou may. Or
in regard what we've asked vou to do as part of this lawsuit, it
seems to me there is not much there.

Mr. 1lobbs: Sounds like vou're coaching your w itness. I le gets to

tell me everv thing he has discussed with his daughter since the
inception of the lawsuit, because he. himself, has advised me that
she's not an attorney practicing law. so there is no attornev client

privilege. Anv conversation in which she was present, whether or
not vou were there, there's no attorney.client privilege.

Mr. Ensor: I disagree on two bases. No. 1. Wendv is a client of our
firm in regard to this matter. And. No. 2, Wendy was acting as an
auent assisting her father with the litigation, therefore an\
conversation would be privileged with regard to this lawsuit.
Mr. 1lobbs: How does she. being a nonlawyer. get to participate in
the privilege?
Mr. Ensor: You should go back and read the rule on privilege and
look at your answer for that.
Mr. ! lobbs: You don't need to give me an answer like that. If you
have a reason, win don't vou tell me what the reason is'.'

Mr. Ensor: A client or client's agents can come under privilege.
Mr. Ilobbs: That's an interesting position with respect to a motion
\'or a protcctiv e order.

O. (Bv Mr. Ilobbs) "fell me about all the discussions vou Ac had
with vour daughter respecting this lawsuit.

Mr. Ensor: Em going to object on previous grounds and instruct the
w itness not to answer.

{). (Bv Mr. 1lobbs) Are vou going to comply with your counsel's
instructions not to answer?

A. Yes, sir.

O. Do vou have anv knowledge of an attorney client relationship
between vour daughter and the linn of Strassberg & Elisor?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. What's your knowledge of that? What do vou understand that to
be?

Mr. Ensor: Objection, vague. Answer ifyou can.
The Witness: 1 think that would be between Wendy and Rick and
Evan.

(.,). (Bv Mr. Ilobbs) Do vou know what they're representing in, with
respect to?

A. I would say with respect to this case.

Q. Docs she have any claim to the proceeds or the outcome of this
lawsuit?

Mr. Ensor: Objection, vague, unclear, calls for a legal conclusion.
You may answer.
'1 he Witness: None.

O. (Bv Mr. I lobbs) So whv would she need an attornev with respect
to this lawsuit, to vour knowledge, if any?

Mr. Ensor: Objection, calls for a legal conclusion, no foundation,
vague and unclear. You may answer.

The Witness: What was the question again'.'
(Question read.)
O. (Bv Mr. 1lobbs) Whev would she need - let me reask the

question. To vour knowledge, whv would she need an attorney in
connection with this lawsuit'.'

Mr. Ensor: Same objections. You may answer if you can.

The Witness: 1 really can't answer that for her.

O. (Bv Mr. Hobbs) Have you had any discussions with vou can
answer this question with a yes or no, if you would. Have you had
an\ discussions with vour daughter. Wendy, present, or with your
counsel from Strassberg & Elisor?

Mr. Ensor: It's a ves or no question.

The Witness: Would you repeat the question?
Q. (Bv Mr. Hobbs) Have vou had any conversations with your
attornevs at Strassberg A: Ensor at winch your daughter. Wendy, has
been present?
A. Yes.
:•)
O. I low many1.'

A. Now, can I clarify the question?

Mr. Ensor: Sure, at any time vou can ask him to clarify a question.
fhe Witness: Because. I mean. Wendy 1 know has seen our

attornevs. Are vou saving just when we're having a lawyer client
meeting?
Q. (By Mr. Hobbs) Yes.

Mr. Ensor: I think the question is how many times Wendy has been
in the room when we'v e spoken vv ith Dennis and Marilynn; is that
correct'/

Mr. 1lobbs: fhat's correct.

The Witness: 1 don't recall Wendy coming with us to your office at
all.

Q. (Bv Mr. Hobbs) So you don't recall any conversations, at their
office or otherwise, when you've had conversations with Mr.
Strassberg or Mr, Ensor when your daughter's been present?
A. Not that 1would classify a lawyer client meeting.
(Moler Depo. p.60. IE 5
S.

p.64. IE 6.) (Record at 1246.)

Mr. Moler staled that Ins daughter had had conversations with his counsel.

I le staled "1 know she's had conversations w ith Rick. I mean, not Rick, Em sorrv. w ith
an. Because her husband takes care of his dental work, so I know they've had

^;

con\ crsalions, vou know. concerning thai oi) numerous occasions. But as far as that
we're a client, I couldn't giv c vou a number." (Moler Depo. p. 65, 11.6-1 1.) (Record at
74'

l).

Ms. Wendy Moler-Ecw is testified that she did not have a written retainer

ement w ith Strassberu & Ensor; she testified that these law vers were retained to

aL'reeme

"help me with depositions and responding to subpoenas and if there were any
counterclaims or any lawsuits brought against me. that they would help me with that."
( Moler-Eew is Depo. p. 11-12.) She had never rcceiv ed a bill for services, and had nevei
discussed what she would be charued for services. Id. at 5X. '

1Despite previously having been provided with a copy of (iold Standard Inc. v. American
Barrick Resources Corp.. SOI P.2d 909- <I 'tah ll)90) (holding that '"Retainer agreements
are not generally protected by the attorney-client privilege..."), and despite having
produced a copy of the Molers' retainer letter alter the Plaintiffs, filing of the Motion to
Compel (Record at 1224), Ms. Moler-Eewis was instructed at her deposition not to
disclose additional information respecting her alleged retention of Strassberg & Ensor
(Wendy Moler-Eewis" Depo at 59.)
i !' mini >k' i.uniiNiu'il nr. :k'\; |\:.v i

ARGl \IE\T

POINT I

W E\l)Y-\IOEER LEW IS WAS NOT A "REPRESEN I A I I\ E OE THE
CLIENT" PI RSLAM TO LI AH R. EMI). 504(a)(4).

The Molers. in reliance upon the language of Rule 504(a). seem to suggest that the
catenorv of persons who can be a "representative" under Utah R. Evid. 504(a) is without
limit as to who the representative is. how necessary the assistance is. and when and how

the representative must be identified as such. This position is obv iously untenable,
because if it were to be the state of the law. the presence of any third party in an attorneyclient communication could be rationalized and excused, alter the fact, based upon the

thnd-partvA status as an alleged "representative." Clearly this cannot be the case.
The adv isor> committee note to Rule 504 sets forth that:
Rule 504 is based upon proposed Rule 503 oflhe I anted States Supreme

Court. Rule 504 would replace and supersede Utah Code Ann. ^S-24(S |(2)...
The committee revised the proposed Rule of the I'nited States Supreme
Court to address the issues raised in I 'pjohn Co v. I hiited States. 449 C.S, 3SA,
101 S.Crt 677 (19X1) as to when communications involving representatives of a
corporation are protected by privilege.

The adv isorv committee note specifically clarified that the term "representative o(
a client" would "preclude a general authorization..."
In this case there is no evidence that Ms. Moler-Eewis was "specifically

The absence of a discussion regarding fees either refutes the existence of an attorneyclient relationship, or is indicaiiv e of professional misconduct, as the "basis or role ot the
fee... shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing or within a reasonable
time after commencing the representation." I'tah R. Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.5(b)

authorized" to communicate w ith her counsel prior to the communications taking place;

indeed the record as set forth by the Appellants themselves suggests only that she assisted
the Molers in selecting a counsel and thereafter she has given them occasional legal
adv ice herself. In selecting the counsel she selected, she selected a colleague with whom
she had worked while at the firm of YanCoU Bagley.

After the introduction was made,

the retainer letter was signed by Dennis Moler.

Appellants' Brief attempts to imply that the Molers would have been unable to
piocced m this litigation had Ms. Moler-Eew is not been their representative. They base
this upon the Molers" lack of civil litigation experience, despite the fact that Mr. Moler
himself had been with the EBI i'or 35 years, lie had participated in ten to fifteen

depositions. If Mr. Moler and his wife were not capable of being involved in civil
litigation without the assistance of a daughter, then it is questionable as to what
percentage of the I hah public would be capable of obtaining legal assistance.
Ei rthermore, Ms. Moler-Eew is' pai'ticular background and legal education should not be
considered, as she was not a member of the I hah State Bar at the time, anil her parents

specifically disavowed her status in that respect.
Looking at the various subsections defining a "representative of a client," the only

one to which the Appellants point is the reference to "having authority to obtain
professional legal services." In this case, as set forth above, the Molers themselves
executed the retainer agreement. There is no evidence that Ms. Moler-Eew is acted on
anv advice given bv her parents" counsel and no reasonable basis upon which she would

i\o >o. I.astlv. even assuming she was "specifically authorized to communicate with the

law ver concerning a legal matter" her presence would not have been necessary in those
conversations in which her parents were present. To the extent that she was present in
those conversations, she served no particular value to her parents, other perhaps than to

look over the shoulders of her parents1 hired lawyers: the only advantage she had in
dome this, however, was her status as a lavvvcr. and that is not a basis to expand the

attorney-client priv dege.
POINT II

MS. MOLER-EEWIS IS NOT A REPRESEN TA TIN E OE HER PARENTS

I'NDER REEL 504(a)(4) AND IS THEREEORE NOT INCLCDEI) WITHIN
HIE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE.

Courts have held that the attorney-client privilege should be narrow ly construed
and "Liencrallv does not extend to communications between a client and his or her

counsel which are made in the known presence of a third party." Doe v. Roe, et ah. 244

A.I). 2d 45(i, 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 2 Depu. Eurther. "|t]he presence of an unnecessary

person (Mich as a friend orfamily member, or by conv ersing where others could easily
overhear) results in inapplicability of the privilege." Edward L. Kimball lV Ronald N.
Bovce. I hah Evidence Law 5-9 (Kimball & Boyce. 19%). (Emphasis added.)
I lowever, courts have set limits on the assertion of agency as a way to preserve the

purpose of the priv ilege. In the (iiovan case, cited by Plaintiffs in the court below, the

J Tellirmlv. the Molers have not presented a single case in their Brief which supports their
proposed broad reading of Rule 504.

c<

mil stales that an anient" s "presence must haw heen necessary for the retention of leual

advice."' 1997 U.S.Hist. LEXIS SSI6, *7((\Y.I. 1997). (I jnphasis added.) To avoid a

waiver of the privilege, an agent must be "essential to and in furtherance of the
communication and absent disclosure of the communication to [the agent |, the purpose of

the attorney-client privilege woukl not have been fulfilled because the client could not or
wou

Id not have obtained leual assistance." Id.

It is not enotmh that the information wa?

communicated through a third-party simply out of convenience. Dipalma v._Medjcal
Mavim Lid, ct.al.., I99S U.S. Disi. LEXIS I 74 ;7, *7 (E.D.Pa. llWN).

Ms. Moier-Lew is is clearly not essential to the Plaintiffs legal representation, and
she never was. Plaintiff Mr. Moler is a retired .15-year EBI veteran, and has been

involved in more depositions than almost all citi/ens. Undoubtedly he has more than a
casual familiarity with the legal process and he does not need his daughter's help to

obtain legal assistance. He and his wife prepared for his deposition and attended his

deposition without their daughter being present. Ms. Moler-Eew is and her parents

apparently pick and choose what meetings she attends (if any)/ which clearly establishes
that her presence is not "essential to'" or "necessary" in order for here parents to obtain
adequate representation. That is the standard that must be met to meet the limited
exception to the waiver.
Ms. Moler-! ewis1 occasional involvement in some matters respecting this case is

1See Moler Depo p. 60. stating he could not recall having any meeting with his daughter
and counsel "that 1 would classify a lawyer client meeting."
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clearly out of convenience or desire, and not need. She knows lawyers, has been a

practicing law ver. and is familiar with the process and pleadings. It is natural for her to
help her parents. Ilowever. convenience and wanting to help does not create an agent
relationship or an attorney-client privilege. Courts are and should be wary of extending
the attorney-client priv ilege unnecessarily. Ms. Moler-Eewis is not a designated

representative of the Plaintiffs and conversations m which she is present are not covered
under the attorney-client priv ilege. And adv ice that Vis. Moler-Eewis gives to her

parents, and information that they convey to her. likewise, is not privileged.
fhe nature, frequency and circumstances of Ms. Moler-Ecwis"s participation in

communications with her parents' counsel is unknown, but could have included any or al
of three scenarios: (1) she could have conferred with her parents and counsel.
simultaneously; (2) She cotild have talked with her parents, without their counsel present,
about what thev had discussed with their counsel: or (3) she could have conferred with

her parents' counsel about her parents' case, without her parents being present.
Onlv the last of these three scenarios could possibly have occurred without there

having been a waiver or nonexistence of the priv ilege, and (or those conversations to be

privileged, her communication to counsel would have had to have been "reasonably
necessarv lor the transmission of the communication".

fhe first category ol'communications

counsel and their daughter

those which involved the Molers. their

would not fall within the exceptions of Rule 504, because

her presence in such a conversation would not have been reasonably necessary, and she

woukl not be acting upon any advice given in those discussions. Thus these group
conversations, if anv occurred, were not privileged.

If the Molers told their daughter about their communications with their counsel,
alter those discussions had occurred, they would be waiving the privilege associated with

the otherwise privileged communication, since such a post-conversation disclosure to
their daughter would neither be "in furtherance of the rendition of professional services
... or 11 reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication."
The Appellants' Brief summarizes Ms. Moler-Eew is's involvement as having

"spoken with her parents about drafts of pleadings" and having "discussed with them
st atcuic matters pertaining to the lawsuit."' (Appellants" Brief, Statement of Eacts, "J 12.)
These discussions would not have established her status as a "representative of the client"

under Rule 504(a)(4), ami would not be confidential under Rule 504(a)(0). Nothing in
Rule 504 allows her to shield the adv ice that she, as a non-lawyer, apparently gave to her

parents in these discussions, or to shield the information that they gave to her.
POINT III

PRIOR UTAH PRIX IDEM RESTRK IS Till CLASS Ol THIRD PARTIES
who may in: pui sent w ithou i w aim r oi hie pri\ ile<;e.

The limitation of the "reasonable necessity" of a representative reflects the

tandard previously considered and adopted by lite Utah Supreme Court in the ease of

si;

Hoffman v,_Condcr. 712 P.2d 21b (Utah 19S5). hi that case the lower Com t had held that

the prcdccessoi to current Rule 504 "applies onlv if the presence of a third person, who
overhears a confidential communication is "necessary for...urgent or lile saving

procedures." The proper standard is whether the third person's presence is reasonably
necessary under the circumstances." 712 P.2d at 216-17, citing MeCormick on Evidence.
Section 91, at 2 17-19 (E. Cdearv 3d Ed 19X4). Appellants set forth no basis or present no
areument as to whv Ms. Moler-Eewis was "reasonably necessary for the transmission of

janv] eommunication[s]" between her parents and her counsel other than to stiggest that
she was somehow allowed to "look over their shoulder."" Clcarlv this is untenable and
w

ould place Ms. Moler-Eewis in a special status based upon her education and training;

obviou

sly if she had remained licensed, the attorney-client privilege would apply; in light

of the fact that she was not licensed when the communications occurred, it does not

apply.
POINT IY

NO LOCK AL BASIS DISTINGUISHES COMMUNICATIONS OCCURRING
I1EEORE. AS OPPOSED TO AFTER. HIE RETENTION OE COUNSEL.

Point 11 o\' the Appellants' Argument seems to stiggest that Ms. Moler-Eew is'
status, and the confidentiality of her communications with her parents, somehow changed

when her parents retained their counsel. Iler lather spoke freely in his deposition about
discussions that occurred with her prior to the retention of Strassberg &. Ensor, but they
contend discussions with her after that, regardless of who is involved, are privileged.

Paragraph 1I of the Appellants' Statement of facts set forth. "At all relevant

time^. dating back to at least December 2005. Ms. Moler-Eewis had the authority to
obtain professional legal services, and to act on any advice rendered pursuant thereto, on
behalf of her parents..." Thus in their own Statement of facts the Appellants are

concluding that Ms. Moler-Eewis always was "a representative of the client" as defined

by Rule 504(a)(4). Somehow, however, they imply that the Molers1 disclosure of
conversations before the retention of Strassberg & Elisor does not constitute a waiver of
conversations that occurred (hereafter. This makes no sense in light oflhe fact thai the
interest to be served by preservation of the priv ilege would have been the same before or
after the retention of Strassberg & Elisor, bather Ms. Moler-Lewis"s conversations with

her parents are privileged, or they are not. The fact that her parents retained counsel in
Eebruary 2000 would not change that.
The attorney-client privilege is obviously based upon policy considerations, and as

the Appellants point out, it is io encourage candor between counsel and their client. The
pnvilege can, however, be waived by the unnecessary presence of unnecessary third
parties, and that is what happened here. It is illogical to suggest that Mr. Moler hail no
right to preserve the eonlKlentiahty of conversations between him and his daughter before
they hired a lawyer, but that somehow- his conversations with her after he hires a lawyer
become privileged and confidential. This is particularly true when the Appellants" own
statetl Eaets sei forth no logical distinction as to how her status may have changed when
counsel was retained.

POINT \

MS. MOLEIM EW IS WAS NOP A CLIENT WITH A COMMON IN PERES I.

Appellants" Memorandum suggests, although they do not directly argue, that the
commonality of interest between Ms. Moler-Eewis and her parents, and. or the fact that

•die mav have been a client of Strassberg & Ensor. somehow establishes another basis tor

the privilege. While this is not directly argued, it should not distract the Court from the

proper focus, which is that there is no ev idence that the interests of Ms. Moler-Lewis
were ide ntical

to those ofdier parents. She allegedly retained Strassberg & Ensor to

defend herself in a potential claim for defamation, despite the fact that she had no
evidence that such a claim was imminent. {See Depo o\' Wendy Moler-Eew is at II.)'
CONCLUSION

Quite clearlv. the conversations which occurred between the Molers and their

counsel are privileged, and cannot be explored. However, equally clear is the tact that
their daughter's involvement or presence in tho>e conversations was not in any way

arv. and to the extent that she occasionally appeared in some of those meetings, she

necess;

" In the Court below, Plaintiffs argued that the attorney-client priv ilege is not waived
when confidential information is shared with a third party who shares a common interest.
United States v. IRedacted]. 209 E.R.I). 4~5, 4^9 (l).Utah 2001). However in the next

paragraph of that opinion, the court further clarities the doctrine and states that tor a
eommunitv of interest to exist, the parties must have an "identical legal interest with

respect to the subject matter of a communication between an attornev and a client
concerning leeal advice.. /fhe kev consideration is that the nature ot the interest he
identical, not similar." Id. chirm M. Indus.. Inc. v. Commercial Union his. Co., 144
E.R.I). 225. 230-31 (D.N.J. 1992). (Emphasis added.)
w

was not acting as a "representative of the client." Clearly there is no priv ilege which
exists as to the conversations in which Wendy Moler-Eewis was a party, and the trial

court correctly granted the Motion to Compel. This Court can and should affirm the

Appellees* Motion to Compel and should clarify that in light of the absence of privilege
the Appellees have the right to depose Mr. Moler and Ms. Moler-Eewis regarding these
conversations To the extent that M. Moler and Ms. Molcr-Ecw is's recollections may be
u ldear. counsel themselves mav be deposed as to those conversations.
DATED this

day of.Inly, 2007.
HOIULS & OLSON, L.C.
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The necessity ol deposing the Appellants' counsel was not directly raised in the trial
court below, on the assumption that Mr. Moler and Ms. Moler-Eewis would have, at the
time of the original Motion, presumably had a good recollection of the matters that thev
discussed. In lighl of the delay occasioned by this Interlocutory Appeal, and the potential
delay in the rescheduling of"their depositions, however, the Court should clarify that the
depositions of counsel will be allowed in the event that the information sought cannot be
recalled bv the witnesses.
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i

Q.

When did you acquire that?

2

A.

I closed on that, I bpn
elieve,

3

this

year.

Q5

you

own

6

r.
10

11

that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Is that in a homeowners association?

A.

Not that I'm aware of.

No, it's not a

Q.
correct

And you met Mr. Strassberg at VanCott Bagley,

--

12

A.

Uh-hm-n.

13

Q-

-- when you worked together?

14

ti

it's my

understanding that you have retained the firm cf
Strassberg & Ensor; is that correct?

i y

A.

Yes.

Q.

And when did you — when did you retain the

A.

It would have been January of this ye

Q.
21

2 3

with
25

a r

.,

Do you have a written retainer agreement with

hem?

22

—»

And your residence out at La Quinta Place, d-

homeowners.

l.

*

end of July of

A.

No,

Q.

What's the nature cf your verbal agreement

just

verbal.

them?

A.

Well,

obvious 1 y to help

me with depc
positions

responding tc subpoenas and if there were any
-.terclairr.s or any lawsuits brought against me,

hey would defend me with that.

Q.

Have you, at any time, been threatened with a

cunterciaim related to this action?
A.

It's

my

--

MR. ENSOR:

I'm going to object: tc that and

nst-ruct the witness not to answer to the extent it
eveaIs any attcrney/ciient ccounicatior.s.
If ycu can answer that question, otherwise,
"eel

free.

THE WITNESS:

Q.

No

(BY MR. HOBBS)

comment.

Other than ccmm

•cu've had with counsel, have you ever had
--•; --rrc1aims threatened against you that y

MR.

ENSOR:

Co ] ect ion,

THE WITNESS:
m e a n

.i ' r e

aware

that

.-

to

you

t. h 1 S

Other than commun

at:ens

c:

vcu may have he a r d thr

c 1 a ::

se 1 , have
-^d

•- j

o

or

i

-

vague .

Can ycu repeat

(BY MR. HOBBS)

l

i ens

tec

-3w s u

mo

e aware

cf

any

a a a in st

you ?

back

your

to

ins

threats

:n i t ia

e l e r.

12

lett. ers,

yeah.
MR.

HOBBS:

Okay.

MR.

ENSOR:

Off

(A brief

Q.
working

Rita

*

(BY MR.

with

when

break

HOBBS)

you

record.

was

taken.)

Who was the broker you were

were at

I

Q.

Did you have any association or dealings with

name.

you

were

not

to

my

recollection.

to

my

recollection.

A.

No,

11

Q.

Pardon?

12

A.

No,

13

Q•

Did ycu
m

not

Red

at

his

while

10

purchase

remember

Stonebrook?

A.

Luke

can't

the

Stonebrook?

know Rita

Luke pricr

to

the

Lukes'

Feather?

15

A.

No.

" f.

Q.

Gain g back to the oral retainer agreement you

r.ave

with Strassberg & Ensor,

compensation
A.

?J^P

received
21

a

C-

you're

providing

We

didn't

bill

yet,

What

talk

what's
to

about

the nature cf

them?
that

and

I

ha

ven

C

so...

exactly did

you

talk

to

22

respect to

23

them about with respect to the retention?

them, about

wit

the retention if you -- what did ycu talk tc

MR.

the

the

ENSOR:

Objection.

witness not to answer.

Calls

I'm going

for

to

uisin

attorr.ey/cli e n t

privilege .

MR. HOBBS:

I thought we had established that

the nature of the retention is not privileged?
MR. ENSOR:

You're asking for her

communications with us, what we discussed.
MR. HOBBS:

With respect to your retention.

MR. ENSOR:

And you've gene through that, I

MR. HOBBS:

Well,

think.

10

details.

I didn't go into any

She said it was oral and she said it was for

purposes of defending depositions and dealing with
subpoenas, but I don't think she elaborated beyond that,
13

and I think that it's not privilege.
MR. ENSOR:

Her communications -- can you

restate the question perhaps?

MR. HOBBS:

I want to know about the

17

discussion that she had with you when she retained your

13

firm to represent her.

MR. ENSOR:

19

I'rr. not going to allow ycu to go

20

into discussions sne had with us when she retained our

21

firm.

22

engagement, she's given you those.

I mean, you've asked for details about the

MR. HOBBS:

23

24

25

Well, I guess we can defer this

cart for a decision on the -- from the Court.

Q.

(BY MR. HOBBS)

During the conversation you
59

